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Collusion Among Interest Grops: Foreign Aid and Rent Dissipation

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Author Info
Svensson, Jakob () (The World Bank)
Abstract

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, an increase in government revenue will be completely crowded out by increased rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered. In this model, there are two possible ways in which foreign aid may affect the outcome. First, as foreign aid to a large extent can be seen as general budget support, the paper provides an explanation for why increased disbursements do not necessarily lead to higher provision of public goods. Second, the mere fact that the donor is expected to allocate aid according to the recipients' future needs may increase rent dissipation and reduce the number of periods in which efficient policies can be sustained.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number 610.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 03 Nov 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of International Economics, 2000, pages 437-461.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0610

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Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
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Related research
Keywords: game-theoretic model; public policy; developing country; government revenue; crowding out; foreign aid;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
O20 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

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  1. Alessandra Casella & Barry Eichengreen, 1994. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?," NBER Working Papers 4694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Mohammad, Sharif & Whalley, John, 1984. "Rent Seeking in India: Its Costs and Policy Significance," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(3), pages 387-413.
  5. Aaron Tornell, 1993. "Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 4354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Where are we in the Political Economy of Reform?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 733, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Joshua Aizenman, 1990. "Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate," NBER Working Papers 3561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  12. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Klitgaard, Robert, 1989. "Incentive myopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 447-459, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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