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Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability

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  • Ahmed Doghmi

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Abderrahmane Ziad

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2008. "Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability," Post-Print halshs-00337154, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00337154
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williams, Steven R, 1986. "Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 139-151, January.
    2. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
    3. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    4. Ziad, Abderrahmane, 1998. "A new necessary condition for Nash implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 381-387, May.
    5. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008. "Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 157-160, July.
    6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
    7. Ziad, Abderrahmane, 1997. "On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 209-213, October.
    8. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doghmi Ahmed & Ziad Abderrahmane, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-14, September.
    2. Doghmi Ahmed, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 35-42, October.
    3. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    4. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane ZIAD, 2012. "On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201201, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    5. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008. "Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 157-160, July.
    6. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    7. William Thomson, 2010. "Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, March.
    8. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
    9. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.
    10. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
    11. Doghmi Ahmed, 2014. "Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2-4), pages 1-6, July.
    12. Doghmi Ahmed, 2016. "On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 767-795, June.

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