Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
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- Ziad, Abderrahmane, 1998. "A new necessary condition for Nash implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 381-387, May.
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