Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
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- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2008. "Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability," Post-Print halshs-00337154, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008.
"Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 157-160, July.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2008. "Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences," Post-Print halshs-00337149, HAL.
- Williams, Steven R, 1986. "Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 139-151, January.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
- Ziad, Abderrahmane, 1998. "A new necessary condition for Nash implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 381-387, May.
- Ziad, Abderrahmane, 1997. "On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 209-213, October.
- Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
- Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
- Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Doghmi Ahmed & Ziad Abderrahmane, 2013.
"On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-14, September.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," Post-Print halshs-00869873, HAL.
- Doghmi Ahmed, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 35-42, October.
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015.
"Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Post-Print halshs-01116843, HAL.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane ZIAD, 2012. "On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201201, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008.
"Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 157-160, July.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2008. "Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences," Post-Print halshs-00337149, HAL.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- William Thomson, 2010. "Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, March.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
- Hagiwara, Makoto, 2019. "Double implementation without no-veto-power," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 124-130.
- Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.
- Doghmi Ahmed, 2014. "Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2-4), pages 1-6, July.
- Doghmi Ahmed, 2016. "On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 767-795, June.
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