Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
AbstractIn exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, we find that: (1) several solutions satisfy Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad [Doghmi, A., Ziad, A., 2008-this issue. Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability. Economics Letters.], (2) strict monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity. We examine also the implementation of the weak core in coalitional games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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- Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August.
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- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane ZIAD, 2012. "On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201201, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
- Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- William Thomson, 2010. "Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, March.
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