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Central bank transparency, the accuracy of professional forecasts, and interest rate volatility

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  • Menno Middeldorp

Abstract

Central banks worldwide have become more transparent. An important reason is that democratic societies expect more openness from public institutions. Policymakers also see transparency as a way to improve the predictability of monetary policy, thereby lowering interest rate volatility and contributing to economic stability. Most empirical studies support this view. However, there are three reasons why more research is needed. First, some (mostly theoretical) work suggests that transparency has an adverse effect on predictability. Second, empirical studies have mostly focused on average predictability before and after specific reforms in a small set of advanced economies. Third, less is known about the effect on interest rate volatility. To extend the literature, I use the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) transparency index for twenty-four economies of varying income and examine the impact of transparency on both predictability and market volatility. I find that higher transparency improves the accuracy of interest rate forecasts for three months ahead and reduces rate volatility.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 496.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:496

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Keywords: Banks and banking; Central ; Disclosure of information ; Interest rates ; Forecasting ; Financial markets;

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  1. Cruijsen, C.A.B. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
  1. repec:use:tkiwps:1205 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
  3. Runchana Pongsaparn & Panda Ketruangroch & Dhanaporn Hirunwong, 2012. "Monetary Policy conduct in Review: The Appropriate Choice of Instruments," Working Papers 2012-05, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand.
  4. Ansgar Belke, 2013. "Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures – Magic Wand or Tiger by the Tail?," Review of Economics, Lucius & Lucius, vol. 64(3), pages 341-364.
  5. Clemens J.M. Kool & Daniel L. Thornton, 2012. "How effective is central bank forward guidance?," Working Papers 2012-063, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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