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Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction

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Author Info
Spencer Dale () (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
Athanasios Orphanides () (Central Bank of Cyprus)
Par Osterholm () (Uppsala University)

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Abstract

Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. If the public is able to assess accurately the quality of the imperfect information communicated by a central bank, such communication can inform and improve the public’s decisions and expectations. But if not, communicating imperfect communication has the potential to mislead and distract. The risk that imperfect communication may detract from the public’s understanding should be considered in the context of a central bank’s communications strategy. The risk of distraction means the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public’s understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.

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File URL: http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/NPWPE_No1_022008.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Central Bank of Cyprus in its series Working Papers with number 2008-1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cyb:wpaper:2008-1

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Web page: http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1
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Related research
Keywords: Transparency; forecasts; learning;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 9884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central-bank communication and policy effectiveness," Discussion Papers 0506-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Is Central Bank Transparency Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," NBER Working Papers 10829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bernhard Winkler, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoogduin, Lex & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2008. "Optimal Central Bank Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 6889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Martin Cihák & Katerina Smídková & Ales Bulir, 2008. "Writing Clearly: ECB’s Monetary Policy Communication," IMF Working Papers 08/252, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kosuke Aoki & Takeshi Kimura, 2008. "Central Banks Two-Way Communication with the Public and Inflation Dynamics," CEP Discussion Papers dp0899, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

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