Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jan-Egbert Sturm
  • Jakob Haan

    ()

Abstract

Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real time expected inflation and output are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10290-010-0076-4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of World Economics.

Volume (Year): 147 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 41-58

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:147:y:2011:i:1:p:41-58

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Email:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10290/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: ECB; Central bank; Communication; Taylor rule; E52; E53; E3;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Janko Gorter & Jan Jacobs & Jakob de Haan, 2008. "Taylor Rules for the ECB using Expectations Data," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(3), pages 473-488, 09.
  2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  3. Heinemann, Friedrich & Ullrich, Katrin, 2005. "Does it Pay to Watch Central Bankers' Lips? The Information Content of ECB Wording," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  4. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 2006. "Does money matter in the ECB strategy? New evidence based on ECB communication," Discussion Papers 2006/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  5. Claus Brand & Daniel Buncic & Jarkko Turunen, 2010. "The Impact of ECB Monetary Policy Decisions and Communication on the Yield Curve," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(6), pages 1266-1298, December.
  6. Tae-Hwan Kim & Paul Mizen & Alan Thanaset, 2006. "Forecasting changes in UK interest rates," Discussion Papers 06/06, University of Nottingham, Granger Centre for Time Series Econometrics.
  7. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Purdah-On the Rationale for Central Bank Silence around Policy Meetings," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 517-528, 03.
  8. Gerberding, Christina & Seitz, Franz & Worms, Andreas, 2005. "How the Bundesbank really conducted monetary policy," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 277-292, December.
  9. Rosa, Carlo & Verga, Giovanni, 2007. "On the consistency and effectiveness of central bank communication: Evidence from the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 146-175, March.
  10. Glenn D. Rudebusch, 2001. "Term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia," Working Paper Series 2001-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  11. Marie Musard-Gies, 2005. "Do ECB's statements steer short-term and long-term interest rates in the euro zone?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 56, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  12. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  13. William Poole, 2001. "Expectations," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 1-10.
  14. Gerberding, Christina & Worms, Andreas & Seitz, Franz, 2004. "How the Bundesbank really conducted monetary policy: An analysis based on real-time data," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,25, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  15. Boero, Gianna & Smith, Jeremy & Wallis, Kenneth F., 2011. "Scoring rules and survey density forecasts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 379-393, April.
  16. Ullrich, Katrin, 2007. "Inflation Expectations of Experts and ECB Communication," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-054, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  17. Jakob Haan, 2008. "The effect of ECB communication on interest rates: An assessment," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 375-398, December.
  18. Kerstin Bernoth & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "The Euribor Futures Market: Efficiency and the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-24, 03.
  19. Walsh, Carl E., 2004. "Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the Strategy of Monetary Policy," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt84g1q1g6, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
  20. Stephan Sauer & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2007. "Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 375-398, 08.
  21. Christian Conrad & Michael J. Lamla, 2007. "The High-Frequency Response of the EUR-US Dollar Exchange Rate to ECB Monetary Policy Announcements," KOF Working papers 07-174, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  22. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2007. "Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2-3), pages 509-541, 03.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-48, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  2. Badinger, Harald & Nitsch, Volker, 2014. "National representation in supranational institutions: The case of the European Central Bank," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-33.
  3. Menno Middeldorp, 2011. "Central bank transparency, the accuracy of professional forecasts, and interest rate volatility," Staff Reports 496, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  4. Michael J. Lamla & Lena Dräger & Damjan Pfajfar, 2013. "Are Consumer Expectations Theory-Consistent? The Role of Macroeconomic Determinants and Central Bank Communication," KOF Working papers 13-345, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  5. Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2013. "Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4278-4285.
  6. Menno Middeldorp, 2011. "FOMC communication policy and the accuracy of Fed Funds futures," Staff Reports 491, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  7. Paul Hubert, 2013. "ECB projections as a tool for understanding policy decisions," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-04, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  8. Cécile Bastidon, 2013. "Un modèle théorique d'intermédiation : transmission et gestion des chocs," Post-Print hal-00806524, HAL.
  9. Paul Hubert, 2013. "ECB projections as a tool for understanding policy decisions," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2013-04, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  10. Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2013. "Superstar Central Bankers," Research Papers in Economics 2013-08, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  11. Matthias Neuenkirch & Pierre L. Siklos, 2013. "What's in a Second Opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England," CAMA Working Papers 2013-46, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  12. Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Inflation targeting, credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 30-45.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:weltar:v:147:y:2011:i:1:p:41-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.