Monetary Policy Transparency:Lessons from Germany and the Eurozone
AbstractThe conduct of monetary policy emphasises institutional arrangements which make monetary policy decision-making more ‘transparent’. Judged by these institutional features neither the Bundesbank, nor the ECB, score very highly. We test for (i) agents’ average ability to anticipate policy rate changes under the Bundesbank and the ECB and (ii) and agents’ forecasting unanimity of money market rates. Rising forecasting uncertainty may either be due to a lack of ECB transparency or to larger inflation and growth forecasting errors. Our results indicate that inflation forecast spreads widened amongst private agents and that inflation forecasting uncertainty increased the forecasting spread of money market rates
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of the West of England, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0410.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
transparency; yield curve; forecasting uncertainty; Bundesbank; ECB;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-03-11 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2006-03-11 (European Economics)
- NEP-FMK-2006-03-11 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-FOR-2006-03-11 (Forecasting)
- NEP-MAC-2006-03-11 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2006-03-11 (Monetary Economics)
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