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Central bank transparency under model uncertainty

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Stefano Eusepi

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Abstract

This paper explores the effects of central bank transparency on the performance of optimal inflation targeting rules. I assume that both the central bank and the private sector face uncertainty about the "correct" model of the economy and have to learn. A transparent central bank can reduce one source of uncertainty for private agents by communicating its policy rule to the public. ; The paper shows that central bank transparency plays a crucial role in stabilizing the agents' learning process and expectations. By contrast, lack of transparency can lead to expectations-driven fluctuations that have destabilizing effects on the economy, even when the central bank has adopted optimal policies.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 199.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:199

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Keywords: Monetary policy ; Inflation (Finance) ; Banks and banking; Central ; Uncertainty;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2001. "Chaotic Interest Rate Rules," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 259, Society for Computational Economics.
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  2. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Seppo Honkapohja & Kaushik Mitra, 2006. "Learning Stability in Economies with Heterogeneous Agents," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(2), pages 284-309, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 9884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  6. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2001. "The Perils of Taylor Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 96(1-2), pages 40-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. James Bullard, 1991. "Learning equilibria," Working Papers 1991-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Brian Sack & Eric Swanson, 2003. "The excess sensitivity of long-term interest rates: evidence and implications for macroeconomic models," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Stefano Eusepi, 2004. "Does Central Bank Transparency Matter for Economic Stability," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 176, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," NBER Working Papers 10829, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Evans, George W & Honkapohja, Seppo, 2001. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 2805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2001. "Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 167-186, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 651, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  15. James Bullard & Kaushik Mitra, . "Determinacy, Learnability, and Monetary Policy Inertia," Discussion Papers 00/43, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Howitt, Peter, 1992. "Interest Rate Control and Nonconvergence to Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 776-800, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Klaus Adam & George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2004. "Are Stationary Hyperinflation Paths Learnable?," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/15, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  18. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Adaptive learning and monetary policy design," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 1045-1084.
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  19. Preston, Bruce, 2005. "Learning about Monetary Policy Rules when Long-Horizon Expectations Matter," MPRA Paper 830, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "Monetary policy rules, macroeconomic stability and inflation: a view from the trenches," Working Paper Series 115, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Jean Boivin & Marc P. Giannoni, 2003. "Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?," NBER Working Papers 9459, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Andrew T. Levin & Fabio M. Natalucci & Jeremy M. Piger, 2004. "The macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-80. [Downloadable!]
  23. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, September.
  24. Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Svensson, Lars E O & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Implementing Optimal Policy Through Inflation-Forecast Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  26. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2005. "Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 498-527, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Preston, Bruce, 2006. "Adaptive learning, forecast-based instrument rules and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 507-535, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. McCallum, Bennett T., 1999. "Issues in the design of monetary policy rules," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1483-1530 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1982. "Sticky Prices in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1187-1211, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2002. "Backward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules, Interest-Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 14 Feb 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  31. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Troy Davig, 2007. "Phillips curve instability and optimal monetary policy," Research Working Paper RWP 07-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness," NBER Working Papers 11898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Sheila Dow & Matthias Klaes & Alberto Montagnoli, 2007. "Risk and Uncertainty in Central Bank Signals: An Analysis of MPC Minutes," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2007/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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