Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Monetary and macroprudential policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Angelini, Paolo
  • Neri, Stefano
  • Panetta, Fabio

Abstract

We use a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector to assess the interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy. We find that in “normal” times (when the economic cycle is driven by supply shocks) macroprudential policy generates only modest benefits for macroeconomic stability over a “monetary-policy-only” world. And lack of cooperation between the macroprudential authority and the central bank may even result in conflicting policies, hence suboptimal results. The benefits of introducing macroprudential policy tend to be sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics. In these cases a cooperative central bank will “lend a hand” to the macroprudential authority, working for broader objectives than just price stability in order to improve overall economic stability. From a welfare perspective, the results do not yield a uniform ranking of the regimes and, at the same time, highlight important redistributive effects of both supply and financial shocks. JEL Classification: E44, E58, E61

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1449.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 1449.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20121449

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 16 03 19, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Phone: +49 69 1344 0
Fax: +49 69 1344 6000
Web page: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Press and Information Division, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: capital requirements; Macroprudential policy; monetary policy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 606-10, May.
  2. Kannan Prakash & Rabanal Pau & Scott Alasdair M., 2012. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in a Model with House Price Booms," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-44, June.
  3. Benigno, Gianluca & Chen, Huigang & Otrok, Christopher & Rebucci, Alessandro & Young, Eric R, 2011. "Financial Crisis and Macro-Prudential Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 8175, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Bernanke, Ben S. & Gertler, Mark & Gilchrist, Simon, 1999. "The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1341-1393 Elsevier.
  5. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Chris Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric Young, 2010. "Revisiting Overborrowing and Its Policy Implications," CEP Discussion Papers dp1020, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  6. Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3400-3426, December.
  8. Tommaso Monacelli, 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Collateralized Household Debt and Borrowing Constraints," NBER Working Papers 12470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2008. "Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 659, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  10. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 2008. "Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison," Scholarly Articles 11129156, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles Evans, 2001. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan Thakor, 2010. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating bank leverage when there is rent seeking and risk shifting," Staff Reports 469, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  13. Ehrmann, M. & Smets, F., 2001. "Uncertain Potential Output: Implications for Monetary Policy," Papers 59, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.
  14. Francisco Covas & Shigeru Fujita, 2009. "Time-varying capital requirements in a general equilibrium model of liquidity dependence," Working Papers 09-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  15. Beau, D. & Clerc, L. & Mojon, B., 2012. "Macro-Prudential Policy and the Conduct of Monetary Policy," Working papers 390, Banque de France.
  16. Jeanne, O. & Korinek, A., 2010. "Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach," Discussion Paper 2010-108S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  17. Frank Smets & Raf Wouters, 2003. "An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1123-1175, 09.
  18. Kim, Jinill & Kim, Sunghyun Henry, 2003. "Spurious welfare reversals in international business cycle models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 471-500, August.
  19. Van den Heuvel, Skander J., 2008. "The welfare cost of bank capital requirements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 298-320, March.
  20. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2004. "Optimal Simple and Implementable Monetary and Fiscal Rules," NBER Working Papers 10253, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
  22. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
  23. Per Krusell & Anthony A. Smith, Jr., 1999. "On the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 245-272, January.
  24. Matteo Iacoviello, 2002. "House prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 542, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Dec 2004.
  25. Andrea Gerali & Stefano Neri & Luca Sessa & Federico M. Signoretti, 2010. "Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the euro area," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 740, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  26. Papa M'B. P. N'Diaye, 2009. "Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 09/257, International Monetary Fund.
  27. repec:reg:wpaper:643 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Ozlale, Umit, 2003. "Price stability vs. output stability: tales of federal reserve administrations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1595-1610, July.
  29. Pelin Ilbas, 2007. "Revealing the preferences of the US Federal Reserve," Working Paper 2008/21, Norges Bank, revised 12 Dec 2008.
  30. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 1995. "Credit Cycles," NBER Working Papers 5083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Ignazio Angeloni & Ester Faia, 2009. "A Tale of Two Policies: Prudential Regulation and Monetary Policy with Fragile Banks," Kiel Working Papers 1569, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  32. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
  33. Paolo Angelini & Andrea Enria & Stefano Neri & Fabio Panetta & Mario Quagliariello, 2010. "Pro-cyclicality of capital regulation: is it a problem? How to fix it?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 74, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  34. Catte, Pietro & Cova, Pietro & Pagano, Patrizio & Visco, Ignazio, 2011. "The role of macroeconomic policies in the global crisis," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 787-803.
  35. Enrique G. Mendoza & Javier Bianchi, 2011. "Overborrowing, Financial Crises and ‘Macro-Prudential’ Policy?," IMF Working Papers 11/24, International Monetary Fund.
  36. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2008. "The Procyclical Effects of Basel II," CEPR Discussion Papers 6862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  37. Claudio Borio & Mathias Drehmann, 2009. "Assessing the risk of banking crises - revisited," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
  38. Petit, Maria Luisa, 1989. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Co-ordination: A Differential Game Approac h," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(2), pages 161-79, April-Jun.
  39. Charles Bean & Matthius Paustian & Adrian Penalver & Tim Taylor, 2010. "Monetary policy after the fall," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 267-328.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20121449. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Official Publications).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.