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Credit and banking in a DSGE model of the euro area

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  • Andrea Gerali

    () (Bank of Italy)

  • Stefano Neri

    () (Bank of Italy)

  • Luca Sessa

    () (Bank of Italy)

  • Federico M. Signoretti

    () (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

This paper studies the role of credit-supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. For this purpose, we introduce an imperfectly competitive banking sector into a DSGE model with financial frictions. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households and firms, obtain funding via deposits and accumulate capital from retained earnings. Margins charged on loans depend on bank capital-to-assets ratios and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. Bank balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and cost of loans. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the euro area. The analysis delivers the following results. First, the existence of a banking sector partially attenuates the effects of demand shocks, while it helps propagate supply shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector explain the largest share of the fall of output in 2008 in the euro area, while macroeconomic shocks played a limited role. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital has a substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 740.

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Date of creation: Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_740_10

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Keywords: collateral constraints; banks; banking capital; sticky interest rates;

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  1. De Bandt, Olivier & Davis, E. Philip, 2000. "Competition, contestability and market structure in European banking sectors on the eve of EMU," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1045-1066, June.
  2. Gregory de Walque & Olivier Pierrard & Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2008. "Financial (in)stability, supervision and liquidity injections: a dynamic general equilibrium approach," BCL working papers 35, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
  3. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2004. "Regulations, market structure, institutions, and the cost of financial intermediation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 593-626.
  4. Roger Aliaga‐Díaz & María Pía Olivero, 2010. "Macroeconomic Implications of “Deep Habits” in Banking," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(8), pages 1495-1521, December.
  5. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2006. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a medium-scale macroeconomic model," Working Paper Series 612, European Central Bank.
  6. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2005. "The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements," 2005 Meeting Papers 880, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9809, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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