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L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique

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Author Info
Gérard Charreaux () (Université de Bourgogne)

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Abstract

L'objectif de ce texte est de montrer comment l'économie financière appréhende l'investissement. La théorie financière néoclassique est une non-théorie de l'investissement. Plus récemment, la recherche financière a proposé une théorie explicative des décisions financières des organisations par aménagement du cadre néo-classique. Les altérations successives et progressives de ce cadre, ont porté sur la forme de la rationalité, l'introduction des conflits d'intérêts entre parties prenantes, la représentation de l'environnement ou encore celle des actifs. Elles ont permis de construire progressivement une finance organisationnelle plus pertinente dont les apports récents permettent notamment d'expliquer certains traits de l'architecture organisationnelle comme réponses aux distorsions du processus d'investissement associées aux différentes altérations précédemment énoncées. La finance organisationnelle, cependant, ne constitue pas un corps théorique unifié. Elle comporte deux branches normative et positive, dont les démarches sont relativement différentes. L'analyse de l'investissement se fond alors dans cette perspective organisationnelle. Cette distinction au sein de la finance organisationnelle correspond à l'irruption des apports des théories économiques néoinstitutionnelles.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1000501.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: May 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in comme chapitre 1 de l'ouvrage de G. Charreaux (coord.) "Images de l'investissement:au-delà de l'évluation financière, une lecture organisationnelle et stratégique", Vuibert Fnege, février 2001, p.13-60.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1000501

Note: article publié comme chapitre 1 de l'ouvrage de G. Charreaux (coord.) "Images de l'investissement:au-delà de l'évluation financière, une lecture organisationnelle et stratégique", Vuibert Fnege, février 2001, p.13-60.
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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Phone: +33(0)380395435
Fax: +33(0)380395488

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gérard Charreaux).

Related research
Keywords: décision d'investissement; altérations du cadre néo-classique; finance organisationnelle;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy

References listed on IDEAS
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