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Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions

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Author Info

  • David Hirshleifer

Abstract

This review examines the incentives of managers to use investment choices as a tool for building their personal reputations or the reputation of their firms. These incentives come in three main forms: visibility bias, which encourages a manager to try to make short-term indicators of success look better; resolution reference which encourages a manager to try to advance the arrival of good news and delay bad news; and mimicry and avoidence, which encourages a manager to take the actions that the best managers are seen to do, and to avoid the actions the worst managers are seen to do.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.

Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:hirshleifer93

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Cited by:
  1. Han, Bing & Hirshleifer, David & Persons, John, 2007. "Promotion Tournaments and Capital Rationing," MPRA Paper 6496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Loss, Frédéric & Renucci, Antoine, . "Professional Reputation, Cash, and Transition to Entrepreneurial Activity," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/2363, Université Paris-Dauphine.
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960601, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  4. Peter Wright & Mark Kroll & Ananda Mukherji & Michael Pettus, 2009. "Do the contingencies of external monitoring, ownership incentives, or free cash flow explain opposing firm performance expectations?," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 215-243, August.
  5. Grant, Simon & King, Stephen & Polak, Ben, 1996. " Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
  6. Basma Sellami Mezghanni, 2009. "Investissement En R&D Et Performance De L'Entreprise : L'Effet Moderateur De La Gouvernance D'Entreprise," Post-Print halshs-00459415, HAL.
  7. Elena Panova, 2009. "Confirmatory News," Cahiers de recherche 0912, CIRPEE.
  8. Sellami Basma, 2008. "Gouvernement D'Entreprise Et Investissement En R&D : Une Etude Sur Le Sbf 250," Post-Print halshs-00525983, HAL.
  9. Basma Sellami Mezghanni, 2010. "How Ceo Attributes Affect Firm R&D Spending? New Evidence From A Panel Of French Firms," Post-Print hal-00479532, HAL.
  10. Ammon, Norbert, 1998. "Why Hedge? - A Critical Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence -," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-18, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  11. Loss, Frédéric & Renucci, Antoine, . "Reputation Capital, Financial Capital, and Transition to Entrepreneurship," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/2945, Université Paris-Dauphine.
  12. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique," Working Papers FARGO 1000501, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).

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