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Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises

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Author Info

  • Gérard Charreaux

    ()
    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises est avant tout une théorie de la latitude managériale. Cet article a pour objectif de contribuer à la construction d'une théorie de la latitude managériale. Il propose en premier lieu une réflexion sur la représentation du comportement des dirigeants dans les principaux courants de la recherche sur le gouvernement des entreprises. En second lieu, il vise à revisiter la question du gouvernement des entreprises en abordant trois questions:(1) celle du lien entre système de gouvernement et stratégie personnelle des dirigeants;(2) celle de la latitude managériale optimale et (3) celle de l'évolution des systèmes de gouvernement.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 0960601.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises" dans la Revue Française de Gestion, n° spécial "Le métier de dirigeant", n°111, novembre-décembre 1996, p.50-64 et repris dans G. Charreaux (Ed.) "Le gouvernement des entreprises", Economica, janvier 1997, p.471-493.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0960601

Note: article publié sous le titre "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises" dans la Revue Française de Gestion, n° spécial "Le métier de dirigeant", n°111, novembre-décembre 1996, p.50-64 et repris dans G. Charreaux (Ed.) "Le gouvernement des entreprises", Economica, janvier 1997, p.471-493.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information:
Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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Related research

Keywords: gouvernement des entreprises; latitude managériale;

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References

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  1. Douglass C. North, 1993. "Five Propositions about Institutional Change," Economic History 9309001, EconWPA.
  2. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Aaron S. Edlin, 1997. "Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies," NBER Working Papers 4145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Paul, Jonathan M, 1992. "On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 471-502.
  4. Garvey, Gerald T. & Swan, Peter L., 1994. "The economics of corporate governance: Beyond the Marshallian firm," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 139-174, August.
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  6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-66, September.
  7. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  9. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
  10. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  11. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
  12. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History 9309003, EconWPA.
  13. Gérard Charreaux, 1994. "Conseil d'administration et pouvoirs dans l'entreprise," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(4), pages 49-79.
  14. D. North, 1997. "Institutional Changes: A Framework of Analysis," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 3.
  15. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  16. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  17. David Hirshleifer, 1993. "Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(2), Summer.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Céline Chatelin, 2003. "Stakeholder Governance and Organizational Performance: Lessons from past privatizations;Gouvernance partenariale et performance organisationnelle:les enseignements des privatisations passées," Working Papers CREGO 1030102, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  2. Christine Marsal, 2006. "La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau," Working Papers CREGO 1060501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 2005. "Pour une gouvernance d’entreprise «comportementale»:une réflexion exploratoire-Toward a Behavioral Corporate Governance Theory : An Exploratory View," Working Papers CREGO 1050601, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  4. Florence Busson-Villa, 2000. "La Gestion Des Risques Dans Les Communes," Post-Print halshs-00587433, HAL.
  5. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "Le rôle de la confiance dans le système de gouvernance des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0980501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  6. Charles Piot, 2001. "Agency costs and audit quality: evidence from France," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 461-499.
  7. Christine Pochet, 2000. "L'Audit Des Risques Dans Les Operations De Fusions-Acquisitions : Le Cas Aerospatiale-Matra," Post-Print halshs-00587503, HAL.
  8. Hamadi Matoussi & Imen Mahfoudh, 2006. "Composition du conseil d'administration et gestion opportuniste des résultats," Post-Print halshs-00548058, HAL.
  9. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
  10. Christel Dubrulle, 2002. "Le Role Des Salaries Dans La Relation Banque-Entreprise," Post-Print halshs-00584465, HAL.
  11. Charles Piot, 2000. "Relations D'Agence, Opportunites De Croissance Et Notoriete De L'Auditeur Externe : Une Etude Empirique Du Marche Français," Post-Print halshs-00587501, HAL.
  12. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique," Working Papers CREGO 1000501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

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