This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gérard Charreaux () (Université de Bourgogne)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises est avant tout une théorie de la latitude managériale. Cet article a pour objectif de contribuer à la construction d'une théorie de la latitude managériale. Il propose en premier lieu une réflexion sur la représentation du comportement des dirigeants dans les principaux courants de la recherche sur le gouvernement des entreprises. En second lieu, il vise à revisiter la question du gouvernement des entreprises en abordant trois questions:(1) celle du lien entre système de gouvernement et stratégie personnelle des dirigeants;(2) celle de la latitude managériale optimale et (3) celle de l'évolution des systèmes de gouvernement.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEG/WP/0960601.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 0960601.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises" dans la Revue Française de Gestion, n° spécial "Le métier de dirigeant", n°111, novembre-décembre 1996, p.50-64 et repris dans G. Charreaux (Ed.) "Le gouvernement des entreprises", Economica, janvier 1997, p.471-493.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0960601

Note: article publié sous le titre "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises" dans la Revue Française de Gestion, n° spécial "Le métier de dirigeant", n°111, novembre-décembre 1996, p.50-64 et repris dans G. Charreaux (Ed.) "Le gouvernement des entreprises", Economica, janvier 1997, p.471-493.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Phone: +33(0)380395435
Fax: +33(0)380395488

Order Information:
Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gérard Charreaux).

Related research
Keywords: gouvernement des entreprises; latitude managériale;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Garvey, Gerald T. & Swan, Peter L., 1994. "The economics of corporate governance: Beyond the Marshallian firm," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 139-174, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edlin, Aaron S & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1995. "Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1301-12, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-66, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Paul, Jonathan M, 1992. "On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 471-502. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David Hirshleifer, 1993. "Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(2), Summer.
  10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Douglass C. North, 1993. "Five Propositions about Institutional Change," Economic History 9309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History 9309003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  16. Douglass C. North, 1994. "Institutional Change: A Framework Of Analysis," Economic History 9412001, EconWPA, revised 14 Dec 1994. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gérard Charreaux, 2005. "Pour une gouvernance d’entreprise «comportementale»:une réflexion exploratoire-Toward a Behavioral Corporate Governance Theory : An Exploratory View," Working Papers FARGO 1050601, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  2. Christine Marsal, 2006. "La cohérence dans la mobilisation du capital humain:une illustration de la théorie de l’architecture organisationnelle dans les banques de réseau," Working Papers FARGO 1060501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  3. Céline Chatelin, 2003. "Stakeholder Governance and Organizational Performance: Lessons from past privatizations;Gouvernance partenariale et performance organisationnelle:les enseignements des privatisations passées," Working Papers FARGO 1030102, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  4. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "Le rôle de la confiance dans le système de gouvernance des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0980501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  5. Charles Piot, 2001. "Agency costs and audit quality: evidence from France," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 461-499, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Variation sur le thème 'A la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise'," Working Papers FARGO 011201, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance), revised Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique," Working Papers FARGO 1000501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All bibliographic data on IDEAS has been put in the public domain by the publishers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.