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Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control

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Author Info
Castanias, Richard P.
Helfat, Constance E.
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-45D0JHR-1N/2/9cfc9cf702001aa1a1d349b8906b3bd1
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 18 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 153-184
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:18:y:1992:i:2:p:153-184

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  1. Aya S. Chacar & William Hesterly, 2008. "Institutional settings and rent appropriation by knowledge-based employees: the case of Major League Baseball," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(2-3), pages 117-136. [Downloadable!]
  2. Deniz Ucbasaran & Paul Westhead & Mike Wright, 2008. "Opportunity Identification and Pursuit: Does an Entrepreneur’s Human Capital Matter?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 153-173, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "L'approche économico-financière de l'investissement: une vision critique," Working Papers FARGO 1000501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  4. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Pour une véritable théorie de la latitude managériale et du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960601, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  5. Peter Wirtz, 2004. "The Changing Institutions of Governance in Corporate France:What Drives the Process?," Working Papers FARGO 1040701, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  6. Anne Stévenot-Guéry & Loris Guéry, 2006. "L’influence des Capital Investisseurs sur la gestion des ressources humaines des entreprises financées:dimensions, enjeux et limites," Working Papers FARGO 1060502, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  7. Peter Wirtz, 2000. "Mental Patterns, Corporate Finance and Institutional Evolution: The Case of the French Corporate Governance System," Working Papers FARGO 1000101, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  8. Evelyne Poincelot, 1999. "Le rôle de l'endettement dans le contrôle du comportement managérial:le cas des firmes dégageant du free cash-flow," Working Papers FARGO 0990301, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Peter Wirtz, 1999. "Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises:le cas Krupp - Thyssen," Working Papers FARGO 0990302, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  11. Hervé Alexandre & Mathieu Paquerot, 2000. "Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants," Working Papers FARGO 1000601, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Elizabeth E. Bailey & Constance E. Helfat, 2003. "External management succession, human capital, and firm performance: an integrative analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 347-369. [Downloadable!]
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