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Privatization and Stakeholder Governance:Theoretical and Methodological issues;Privatisation et gouvernance partenariale enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques

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Author Info
Céline Chatelin (IAE Université d'Orléans - LOG et LATEC/FARGO)

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Abstract

Une revue des arguments théoriques et des résultats empiriques sur la relation particulière privatisation-performance montre que l'hypothèse d'accroissement de performance induit par la privatisation est encore très controversée. Nous développons une approche partenariale de la théorie de la gouvernance et démontrons sa portée explicative dans la compréhension de la dynamique organisationnelle sous-jacente à la privatisation. Nous concluons sur ses perspectives de développement afin d'approfondir notre compréhension de la performance des organisations, de leur blocage et de leur évolution. A survey of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence about relationship between privatization and performance shows that the well-accepted hypothesis of performance increase after privatization is still much debated. We develop a stakeholder approach of corporate governance theory. We analyze its explanatory power to understand more qualitatively how firms evolve when they are privatised. In return, we conclude on the future research agenda of the stakeholder corporate theory so as to deepen our understanding of organizational dynamics in its broadest sense, in terms of organizational performance, freeze and evolution.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1030101.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2003
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Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1030101

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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: approche qualitative; efficience; gouvernance; privatisation; processus décisionnel; valeur partenariale; qualitative approach; efficiency; corporate governance; privatization; decision-making-process; stakeholder value;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Carine Catelin & Céline Chatelin, 2001. "Privatisation, gouvernement d'entreprise et processus décisionnel:une interprétation de la dynamique organisationnelle à travers le cas France Télécom," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 4(2), pages 63-90, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Moerland, Pieter W., 1995. "Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Heckling, 1995. "Specific And General Knowledge, And Organizational Structure," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(2), pages 4-18. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
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  8. Caves, Richard E., 1990. "Lessons from privatization in Britain : State enterprise behavior, public choice, and corporate governance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 145-169, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "La théorie positive de l'agence:lecture et relectures..," Working Papers FARGO 0980901, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  12. Gérard Charreaux, 1999. "La théorie positive de l'agence:positionnement et apports," Working Papers FARGO 0991201, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  13. Gérard Charreaux, 1997. "L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessairement moins efficace?," Working Papers FARGO 0970901, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  14. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers FARGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Demsetz, Harold, 1988. "The Theory of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 141-61, Spring.
  16. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Villalonga, Belen, 2000. "Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 43-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Ehrlich, Isaac & Georges Gallais-Hamonno & Zhiqiang Liu & Randall Lutter, 1994. "Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1006-38, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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