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Au-delà de l'approche juridico-financière:le rôle cognitif des actionnaires et ses conséquences sur l'analyse de la structure de propriété et de la gouvernance

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Author Info
Gérard Charreaux () (Université de Bourgogne)

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Abstract

L'approche juridico-financière dominante de la structure de propriété et de la gouvernance des entreprises est fondée sur l'hypothèse de séparation totale entre les actionnaires et les dirigeants rarement vérifiée, notamment dans les nations européennes. Cette approche repose sur les analyses initiales de Berle et Means et sur la théorie de l'agence, qui conduisent, sur la base d'hypothèses très réductrices, à supposer que les actionnaires n'assument qu'une fonction financière se limitant à l'apport de capitaux et à l'assomption du risque financier. Cette conception possédant un pouvoir explicatif faible au vu des structures réelles d'actionnariat, le présent article propose de prendre en compte le rôle cognitif - d'orientation et d'apport de compétences -, que les actionnaires conservent le plus souvent de façon à proposer un modèle explicatif plus satisfaisant de ces structures. Une telle modélisation s'inscrit également dans les développements visant à proposer une théorie de la gouvernance élargie aux considérations cognitives.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 020701.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision: Jul 2002
Publication status: forthcoming in le n° spécial de la Revue Française de Gestion sur "L'actionnaire", sous le titre "L'actionnaire comme apporteur de ressources cognitives", vol.28, n°141, novembre-décembre 2002, p.77-107.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:020701

Note: article à paraître dans le n° spécial de la Revue Française de Gestion sur "L'actionnaire", sous le titre "L'actionnaire comme apporteur de ressources cognitives", vol.28, n°141, novembre-décembre 2002, p.77-107.
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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
Phone: +33(0)380395435
Fax: +33(0)380395488

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: rôle cognitif de l'actionnaire; structure de propriété; gouvernance des entreprises.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  11. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  12. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers FARGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
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  13. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," NBER Working Papers 8178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Editions Economica, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
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