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Compétences, conflits et création de valeur:vers une approche intégrée de la gouvernance

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Author Info
Peter Wirtz () (Université Louis Lumière (Lyon 2))

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Abstract

L’approche dominante de la gouvernance d’entreprise s’inscrit dans une logique d’essence disciplinaire. Pourtant, la création de valeur ne se réduit pas à un simple problème de discipline, mais comporte également une dimension cognitive, notamment dans le cas des entreprises innovantes. Fort de ce constat, le présent article tente de contribuer à un effort d’intégration des explications disciplinaire et cognitive des phénomènes de gouvernance, en défendant l’hypothèse selon laquelle le poids respectif des variables disciplinaires et cognitives n’est pas figé, mais dépend du stade de développement des entreprises étudiées. Ce cadre théorique est illustré à travers l’histoire longue du Groupe Air Liquide.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1050501.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1050501

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Latec, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Related research
Keywords: gouvernance; approche cognitive; approche disciplinaire; coût cognitif;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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