Évelyne Rouby () (Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis)
Abstract
(VF)Les travaux sur le conseil d’administration étudient souvent ses rôles – usuellement le contrôle ou l’apport de ressources – en relation avec sa composition. Ainsi, le CA serait majoritairement composé d’administrateurs externes indépendants dans le cas du contrôle et d’administrateurs affiliés dans le cas de l’apport de ressources. Ces rôles sont de surcroît présentés comme mutuellement exclusifs, ce qui paraît restrictif. Dans cet article, nous proposons de dépasser cette approche en construisant un nouveau cadre d’analyse fondé sur le concept de capital social.(VA)Most research on the board of directors focuses on its role – either of managerial control or of a provider of resources – in relation to its composition. From this perspective, a board of directors exerting managerial control should be composed of independent directors. When it is a resource provider, the board should be composed of non-independent directors. These roles are considered to be mutually exclusive which appears both restrictive and simplistic. In this paper, we propose to combine these two perspectives in a new analytical framework based on the notion of social capital.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology