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Le point sur... les réseaux d'administrateurs et de dirigeants

Author

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

L'objectif de " ce point sur... " est de montrer que les dimensions sociales et stratégiques des réseaux d'administrateurs et de dirigeants, négligées par la perspective financière de la gouvernance, exclusivement disciplinaire, contribuent à une meilleure compréhension de l'influence de ces réseaux tant sur la performance que sur certains comportements financiers, associés aux banques, aux acquisitions et à la diffusion de certaines pratiques de gouvernance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 2003. "Le point sur... les réseaux d'administrateurs et de dirigeants," Working Papers CREGO 1030801, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1030801
    Note: article à paraître dans Banque & Marchés n° 66, septembre-octobre 2003.
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    File URL: https://repec-crego.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/wp/1030801.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1111, June.
    2. Booth, James R. & Deli, Daniel N., 1999. "On executives of financial institutions as outside directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 227-250, September.
    3. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, June.
    4. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    6. Hee-Jung Yeo & Christine Pochet & Alain Alcouffe, 2003. "CEO Reciprocal Interlocks in French Corporations," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(1), pages 87-108, March.
    7. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money After Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," NBER Working Papers 8694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hazar Ben Barka & Sarah Mokaddem, 2012. "Nature of the Director's profile and Knowledge Transfer in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Literature-based Approach," Post-Print hal-00692350, HAL.
    2. Évelyne Rouby, 2008. "Le lien composition/rôles du conseil d’administration:une analyse en termes de capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(2), pages 29-50, June.
    3. Thomas Vallée & Joël Massol, 2013. "Firm's Network versus Board Members' Network: Who to Appoint?," Working Papers hal-00829905, HAL.
    4. Corinne van Der Yeught & Line Bergery & Isabelle Dherment Férère, 2012. "Les compétences éthiques créent-elles de la valeur ?," Post-Print hal-00689805, HAL.
    5. Houda Ghaya & Gilles Lambert, 2012. "Caractéristiques de la diversité au sein des conseils d’administration et performance financière : une étude empirique sur les entreprises du CAC40," Working Papers of BETA 2012-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Aurélien Eminet & Zied Guedri & Stefan Asseman, 2009. "Le dirigeant est-il l’architecte de sa rémunération? Structure de contrôle du conseil d’administration et mobilisation du capital social," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 5-36, September.
    7. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.
    8. Omar Aouah & Iliass El Badaoui, 2018. "Governance Practices And The Performance Of Establishments And Companies In Morocco: Proposal For A Theoretical Model [Les Pratiques De Gouvernance Et La Performance Des Etablissements Et Entrepris," Working Papers halshs-01956777, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    réseaux d'administrateurs et de dirigeants ; gouvernance des entreprises;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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