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Auswirkungen von Mehrfachmandaten deutscher Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender auf den Unternehmenserfolg

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  • Balsmeier, Benjamin
  • Buchwald, Achim
  • Peters, Heiko

Abstract

Mehrfachmandatsträger in Vorständen und Aufsichtsräten stehen seit langer Zeit in der öffentlichen Kritik. Anhand eines Paneldatensatzes für die größten deutschen Unternehmen im Zeitraum von 1996 bis 2006 wird der Einfluss von Mehrfachmandaten von Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden auf den Unternehmenserfolg untersucht. Die Ergebnisse legen den Schluss nahe, dass zwischen der Anzahl der Aufsichtsratsmandate des Vorstandsvorsitzenden und dem Erfolg seines Unternehmens ein konkaver positiver Zusammenhang besteht: zu viele Mandate wirken offenbar kontraproduktiv. Aufsichtsratsvorsitzende, die in einem anderen Unternehmen als Vorstand tätig sind, erhöhen hingegen tendenziell den Erfolg des kontrollierten Unternehmens. Zusätzliche Aufsichtsratsmandate des Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden haben allerdings keine Assoziation mit der Leistung des kontrollierten Unternehmens. -- Members of management boards as well as supervisory boards often attract public criticism when they are simultaneously active in several other boards. We use a panel data set of the biggest German corporations for the period from 1996-2006 to estimate the impact of multiple board memberships of the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board on corporate performance. The results suggest a positive and concave relation between the number of external supervisory board seats of the CEO and corporate performance. Chairmen of supervisory boards who simultaneously serve on external management boards tend to improve the performance of the controlled firm. Further external supervisory board seats of the chairman of a supervisory board do not seem to have any influence on corporate performance, though.

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Paper provided by German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in its series Working Papers with number 01/2009.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:svrwwp:012009

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Cited by:
  1. Vincenzo Verardi & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Robust Estimation of Linear Fixed Effects Panel Data Models with an Application to the Exporter Productivity Premium," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 231(4), pages 546-557, August.
  2. Rieck, Christian & Bendig, Helena & Hünnemeyer, Julius & Nitzsche, Lisa, 2012. "Diversität im Aufsichtsrat: Studie über die Zusammensetzung deutscher Aufsichtsräte," Working Paper Series: Business and Law 01, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, Faculty of Business and Law.
  3. Mishael Milakovic & Simone Alfarano & Thomas Lux, 2011. "The Small Core of the German Corporate Board Network: New Evidence from 2010," Kiel Working Papers 1740, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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