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• Steven Neil Kaplan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 389-410
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:27:y:1990:i:2:p:389-410

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