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Outside board memberships of CEOs: Expertise or entrenchment?

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  • Balsmeier, Benjamin
  • Buchwald, Achim
  • Peters, Heiko

Abstract

We investigate whether outside board memberships of CEOs signal expertise or entrenchment. The analysis is based on panel data of the largest German companies covering the period from 1996 to 2008. Supporting the entrenchment hypothesis, our analysis reveals that firms having a CEO with one or more outside mandates suffer from significantly weaker firm performance compared with firms having a CEO without any outside board mandates. Moreover, disciplinary CEO turnovers become less likely and turnover-performance sensitivity declines with rising board memberships of the top manager. We conclude that outside mandates enhance managerial power at the expense of the home firm's shareholders. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) in its series DICE Discussion Papers with number 26.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:26

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Keywords: Corporate Governance; Entrenchment; Outside Board Memberships; CEO turnover;

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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Keep CEOs off outside boards
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-08-24 14:25:00
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Cited by:
  1. Christin, Clémence, 2011. "Entry deterrence through cooperative R&D over-investment," DICE Discussion Papers 38, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  2. Stühmeier, Torben & Wenzel, Tobias, 2012. "Regulating advertising in the presence of public service broadcasting," DICE Discussion Papers 41, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  3. Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2012. "Transparency, entry, and productivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 7-10.
  4. Haucap, Justus & Herr, Annika & Frank, Björn, 2011. "In vino veritas: Theory and evidence on social drinking," DICE Discussion Papers 37, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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