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Fired or Retired? A Competing Risks Analysis of Chief Executive Turnover

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  • Ian Gregory-Smith
  • Steve Thompson
  • PeterW. Wright

Abstract

We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996-2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a CEO's tenure. We find evidence that this is because CEOs who survive beyond year four are able to entrench themselves in their position. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 119 (2009)
Issue (Month): 536 (03)
Pages: 463-481

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:536:p:463-481

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Cited by:
  1. Yim, Soojin, 2013. "The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 250-273.
  2. Johansson, Anders C. & Feng, Xunan, 2013. "CEO Incentives in Chinese State-Controlled Firms," Working Paper Series 2013-27, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.
  3. Brian Bell & John Van Reenen, 2011. "Firm Performance and Wages: Evidence from Across the Corporate Hierarchy," CEP Discussion Papers dp1088, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  4. Yudan Zheng, 2010. "The effect of CEO tenure on CEO compensation: Evidence from inside CEOs vs outside CEOs," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 36(10), pages 832-859, October.
  5. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Buchwald, Achim & Peters, Heiko, 2011. "Outside board memberships of CEOs: Expertise or entrenchment?," DICE Discussion Papers 26, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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