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Le dirigeant est-il l’architecte de sa rémunération? Structure de contrôle du conseil d’administration et mobilisation du capital social

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Author Info

  • Aurélien Eminet

    ()
    (ESDES)

  • Zied Guedri

    (EM Lyon)

  • Stefan Asseman

    (EM Lyon)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    (VF)Dans cet article, nous suggérons que les dirigeants disposent de deux leviers d’influence pour obtenir un design de rémunération plus avantageux : leur capital social et la structure de leur conseil d’administration. L’effet de ces deux sources d’influence sur le design de rémunération des dirigeants est testé sur un échantillon composé des dirigeants des entreprises du CAC40 sur une période de 6 années. Nos résultats mettent en évidence l’impact significatif de ces deux leviers sur certaines composantes de la rémunération. L’alignement des intérêts des dirigeants et des actionnaires est dès lors potentiellement fragilisé.(VA)In this study, we suggest that CEOs may draw on two sources of influence in order to obtain an advantageous compensation structure: social capital and board structure. The impact of these two sources of influence is empirically tested using a sample of CEOs of firms belonging to the CAC40 stock index over a sixyear period. Our results highlight the significant impact of social capital and board structure on some components of CEO compensation (salary, bonus and stock-options). As a result, shareholders’ and managers’ interest alignment is potentially weakened.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 5-36

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:12:y:2009:i:q3:p:5-36.

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    Related research

    Keywords: rémunération des dirigeants; conseil d'administration; capital social; CEO compensation; board structure; social capital.;

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    References

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    1. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Gouvernance des entreprises:valeur partenariale contre valeur actionnariale," Working Papers CREGO 0970801, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
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    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
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    11. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
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    13. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    14. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
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