Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Evaluating the board of directors of financial intermediaries: competencies, effectiveness and performance

Contents:

Author Info

  • Carretta, Alessandro
  • Farina, Vincenzo
  • Schwizer, Paola

Abstract

This paper proposes a model for analysing the effectiveness of boards of directors of financial intermediaries. The European Union recommends that companies in the Member States annually evaluate the performance of their boards. The degree of effectiveness of a board should be appreciated taking into account the business structure, ownership and institutional model of the firm, on the one hand, and the characteristics of its board, in terms of its composition, structure and skills, on the other hand. This paper also outlines the specificity of the role played by boards of directors in financial intermediaries, also in the light of the industry standards and regulations, and provides an overview of the board assessment methodologies proposed in literature, or developed by listed companies on the Anglo-saxon markets, with a view to considering their applicability to the financial sector. Lastly, and based on the foregoing, the paper proposes a model for diagnosing the conditions that need to be put into place to ensure the suitability of boards of directors and to evaluate the performance of both the board as a whole and the individual directors.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8299/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8299.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8299

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board of Directors; Performance;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January.
  2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1991. "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), Winter.
  3. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
  4. Klein, April, 1998. "Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 275-303, April.
  5. Coles, Jeffrey & Lemmon, Michael & Meschke, Felix, 2007. "Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance: the Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance," MPRA Paper 4374, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Feb 2007.
  6. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
  7. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  8. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, 06.
  9. Vafeas, Nikos, 1999. "Board meeting frequency and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 113-142, July.
  10. Eisenberg, Theodore & Sundgren, Stefan & Wells, Martin T., 1998. "Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 35-54, April.
  11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  12. Kaplan, Steven N. & Reishus, David, 1990. "Outside directorships and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 389-410, October.
  13. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  14. John A. Wagner III, 1998. "Board Composition and Organizational Performance: Two Studies of Insider/outsider Effects," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(5), pages 655-677, 09.
  15. Murphy, Kevin J. & Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1993. "Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 273-315, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8299. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.