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The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Successes: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities

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Author Info
Paul A. Gompers
Josh Lerner

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Abstract

We examine a sample of over thirty thousand transactions by corporate and other venture organizations. Corporate venture investments in entrepreneurial firms appear to be at least as successful (using such measures as the probability of the portfolio firm going public) as those backed by independent venture organizations, particularly when there is a strategic overlap between the corporate parent and the portfolio firm. While corporate vendue capitalists tend to invest at a premium to other firms, this premium appears to be no higher in investments with a strong strategic fit. Finally, corporate programs without a strong strategic focus appear to be much less stable, frequently ceasing operations after only a few investments, but strategically focused programs appear to be as stable as independent venture organizations. The evidence is consistent with the existence of complementarities that allow corporations to effectively select and add value to portfolio firms, but is somewhat at odds with suggestions that the structure of corporate venture funds limits their effectiveness.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 6725.

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Date of creation: Sep 1998
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6725

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  5. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Susan Athey & Scott Stern, 1998. "An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories About Complimentarity in Organizational Design," NBER Working Papers 6600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. " Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Chemla, Gilles & de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne, 2003. "Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent," CEPR Discussion Papers 4139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Heneric, Oliver & Engel, Dirk & Champenois, Claire, 2004. "The Birth of German Biotechnology Industry : Did Venture Capital run the Show?," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-09, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Julia Hirsch & Uwe Walz, 2006. "Why Do Contracts Differ between VC Types? Market Segmentation versus Corporate Governance Varieties," CFS Working Paper Series 2006/12, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cassiman, Bruno & Ueda, Masako, 2002. "Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups," CEPR Discussion Papers 3429, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Georg Gebhardt, 2000. "Innovation and Venture Capital," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1404, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Peter Wirtz, 2005. "Compétences, conflits et création de valeur:vers une approche intégrée de la gouvernance," Working Papers FARGO 1050501, Université de Bourgogne - Latec/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2008. "Control Rights over Intellectual Property: Corporate Venturing and Bankruptcy Regimes," Working Papers w0118, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Thomas Hellman & Laura Lindsey & Manju Puri, 2004. "Building Relationships Early: Banks in Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 10535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Andrea Schertler, 2004. "Sources of Funds and Specialization Patterns of European Venture Capital Investments," Kiel Working Papers 1200, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Andrea Schertler, 2005. "European venture capital markets: fund providers and investment characteristics," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 367-380, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Tykvová, Tereza, 2004. "Who Are the True Venture Capitalists in Germany?," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-16, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Sorensen, Morten, 2007. "Learning by Investing: Evidence from Venture Capital," SIFR Research Report Series 53, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bartzokas, Anthony, 2001. "European Financial Markets after Emu: A Review of Recent Literature and Evidence," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 1, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. [Downloadable!]
  14. Cécile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, 2004. "Le placement privé et la dimension réglementaire du financement des entreprises," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-51, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  15. Bharant N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Weak Property Rights and hold-up in R&D," Documentos de Trabajo 39, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  16. Schertler, Andrea, 2001. "Venture Capital in Europe's Common Market: A Quantitative Description," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 4, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Mihir A. Desai & William M. Gentry, 2003. "The Character and Determinants of Corporate Capital Gains," Department of Economics Working Papers 195, Department of Economics, Williams College. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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