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Le rôle des sociétés de capital-risque dans la formation d’alliances stratégiques:Une synthèse de littérature - The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Formation of Strategic Alliances:An academic literature review

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  • Kirsten Burkhardt

    ()
    (Université de Bourgogne - LEG/FARGO UMR Cnrs 5118)

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    Abstract

    (VF)Cet article dresse un bilan des travaux existants portant sur le rôle des sociétés de capital-risque dans la formation d’alliances stratégiques. Ils sont présentés en distinguant les points de vue des sociétés de capital-risque et des entreprises formant l’alliance, et, agencés en fonction des deux cadres théoriques qu’ils emploient : les théories contractuelles et cognitives. Au-delà, les limites de ces travaux sont mises en avant et des prolongations possibles sont présentées.(VA)This article reviews and analyses academic work on the role of venture capitalists in the formation of strategic alliances. The presentation takes into account both, the view of the venture capitalists and the view of the companies forming the alliance, and, differentiates between the theoretical frameworks the articles belong to: mainstream theories (transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency) and the knowledge-based view. In addition, the limits of those contributions are highlighted and future investigations are suggested.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1111102.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1111102

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    Related research

    Keywords: capital-risque; alliances stratégiques; finance; gouvernance; stratégie; théories des organisations; théories contractuelles; théories cognitives; théories sociologiques des réseaux; Venture capital; Strategic Alliances; Governance; Strategy; Organizational Theories; Transaction Cost Theory; Agency Theory; Resource-based View; Knowledge-based View; Social Network Theories.;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Schleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2001. "Investor Protection and Corporate Governance," Working Paper Series rwp01-017, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Gérard Charreaux, 2008. "La recherche en finance d’entreprise:quel positionnement méthodologique?," Working Papers FARGO 1080501, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
    3. David H. Hsu, 2006. "Venture Capitalists and Cooperative Start-up Commercialization Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 204-219, February.
    4. Shantanu Banerjee & Sudipto Dasgupta & Yungsan Kim, 2008. "Buyer-Supplier Relationships and the Stakeholder Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2507-2552, October.
    5. Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 1997. "Capabilities and Governance the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization," DRUID Working Papers 97-2, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    6. Colombo, Massimo G. & Grilli, Luca & Piva, Evila, 2006. "In search of complementary assets: The determinants of alliance formation of high-tech start-ups," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1166-1199, October.
    7. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
    8. Wuyts, Stefan & Colombo, Massimo G. & Dutta, Shantanu & Nooteboom, Bart, 2005. "Empirical tests of optimal cognitive distance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 277-302, October.
    9. Baum, Joel A. C. & Silverman, Brian S., 2004. "Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 411-436, May.
    10. Nooteboom, B., 1993. "Firm size effects on transaction costs," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-376115, Tilburg University.
    11. Megginson, William L & Weiss, Kathleen A, 1991. " Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 879-903, July.
    12. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
    13. Teece, David J., 1986. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 285-305, December.
    14. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    15. Sapienza, Harry J. & Manigart, Sophie & Vermeir, Wim, 1996. "Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 439-469, November.
    16. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
    17. Lerner, Josh, 1995. " Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 301-18, March.
    18. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
    19. David H. Hsu, 2004. "What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1805-1844, 08.
    20. Andy Lockett & Mike Wright & Andrew Burrows & Louise Scholes & Dave Paton, 2008. "The export intensity of venture capital backed companies," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 39-58, June.
    21. repec:rie:review:v:15:y:2010:i:3:n:4 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Nahata, Rajarishi, 2008. "Venture capital reputation and investment performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 127-151, November.
    23. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    24. David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, 2007. "Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 559-596.
    25. Gérard Charreaux, 2004. "Les théories de la gouvernance:de la gouvernance des entreprises à la gouvernance des systèmes nationaux," Working Papers FARGO 1040101, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
    26. Laura Lindsey, 2008. "Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1137-1168, 06.
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