Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Les rentes et leurs conséquences en matière de gouvernance des entreprises

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mark Roe

    ()
    (Harvard Law School)

Abstract

Product markets are weaker in some nations than they are in others. Weaker product markets, and the concomitant monopoly rents, can affect corporate governance. They can do so directly by loosening a constraint on managers, thereby increasing managerial agency costs to shareholders. The monopoly profits can also affect corporate governance structures indirectly by setting up a fertile field for conflict inside the firm as the corporate players seek to grab those monopoly profits for themselves. One would expect corporate governance structures, laws, and practices to differ in nations with monopoly-induced high agency costs from those prevailing in nations with more competition, fewer monopolies, and lower agency costs. And we might speculate that these rents when large and widespread could affect democratic politics and law-making.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/rev/051215.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 167-215

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:5:y:2002:i:q1:p:167-215

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.revues.org/

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: agency costs; corporate governance; monopoly rents; politics; law-making.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Au-delà de l'approche juridico-financière:le rôle cognitif des actionnaires et ses conséquences sur l'analyse de la structure de propriété et de la gouvernance," Working Papers CREGO 020701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Jul 2002.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:5:y:2002:i:q1:p:167-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.