On the Selection of Arbitrators
AbstractA key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the problems with current procedures and suggest that alternative procedures, which we propose, may be superior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8724.
Date of creation: Dec 2011
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- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
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- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
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