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On the Selection of Arbitrators

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A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to partake in the selection of the person who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. Theoretical, empirical and experimental arguments are combined to highlight difficulties with a procedure that is commonly used in practice and to develop and identify better performing procedures.

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File URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2012/2012-8_paper.pdf
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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-8.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2012-8

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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Cited by:
  1. Postl, Peter, 2013. "A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 204-209.

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