Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
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- Felix Koelle, 2012.
"Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision,"
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- Guillen, Pablo & Merrett, Danielle & Slonim, Robert, 2013. "A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production," Working Papers 2013-19, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
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