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Structural Uncertainty and Central Bank Conservatism: The Ignorant Should Keep Their Eyes Shut

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Rosal, Joao Mauricio
Spagat, Michael

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Abstract

We study the problem of a central bank whose policy actions simultaneously affect the information flow about its expectations-augmented Phillips curve and its reputation for toughness in fighting inflation. In an environment with an unknown relationship between inflation surprises and output, big inflation surprises yield big short-term output gains and a strong information flow. Yet optimal policy is very conservative because inflation surprises yield information that increases the volatility of both future inflationary expectations and inflation itself. In fact, the more there is that can be learned about the Phillips curve the less does optimal policy aim towards learning.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3568.

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Date of creation: Oct 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3568

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Keywords: central bank conservatism experimentation learning monetary policy reputation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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  1. David Backus & John Driffill, 1984. "Inflation and Reputation," Working Papers 560, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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  2. Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Monetary policy, parameter uncertainty and optimal learning," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-228, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Evans, George W & Honkapohja, Seppo, 2001. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 2805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Honkapohja, Seppo & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Performance of monetary policy with internal central bank forecasting," Research Discussion Papers 3/2002, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Balvers, Ronald J & Cosimano, Thomas F, 1994. "Inflation Variability and Gradualist Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(4), pages 721-38, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-58, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1996. "Monetary Policy as a Process of Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 689-702, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Grossman, Sanford J & Kihlstrom, Richard E & Mirman, Leonard J, 1977. "A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 533-47, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Ellison, Martin, 2003. "The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals," CEPR Discussion Papers 4135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika & Zhang, Lei, 2003. "Learning to Forget? Contagion and Political Risk in Brazil," CEPR Discussion Papers 3785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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