Managing disinflation under uncertainty
AbstractIn this paper we analyze disinflation policy when a central bank has imperfect information about private sector inflation expectations but learns about them from economic outcomes, which are in part the result of the disinflation policy itself. The form of uncertainty is manifested as uncertainty about the effect of past disinflation policy on the current output gap. This differs from other studies on learning and control in a monetary policy context (e.g., [Ellison, 2006] and [Svensson and Williams, 2007]) that assume uncertainty about the effects of current policy actions on the economy. We derive the central bank's optimal disinflation strategy under active learning (DOP) and compare it with two limiting cases--certainty equivalence policy (CEP), or passive learning, and a Brainard-style cautionary monetary policy (CP). It turns out that under the DOP inflation stays between the levels implied by the CEP and the CP. A novel result--e.g., unlike Beck and Wieland (2002)--is that this holds irrespective of the initial level of inflation. At high levels of inherited inflation the DOP moves closer to the CEP, at low levels of inherited inflation the DOP resembles the CP.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc
Learning Inflation expectations Disinflation policy Separation principle Kalman filter Optimal control Dynamic programming;
Other versions of this item:
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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