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A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information

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  • Juin-Kuan Chong
  • Colin F. Camerer
  • Teck H. Ho

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File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/C10175.1.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000537.

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Date of creation: 25 Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000537

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References

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  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  2. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-51, September.
  3. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  4. David J. Cooper & Susan Garvin & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 662-683, Winter.
  5. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. James Andreoni & John H Miller, 1997. "Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 670, David K. Levine.
  7. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  8. Neral, John & Ochs, Jack, 1992. "The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1151-69, September.
  9. Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-94, February.
  10. Selten,Reinhard, . "Anticipatory learning in two-person games," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 93, University of Bonn, Germany.
  11. Noussair, C.N. & Lei , V. & Plott, C., 2001. "Non-speculative bubbles in experimental asset markets: Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-381105, Tilburg University.
  12. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  13. Ernst Fehr & Simon G�chter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
  14. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1988. "Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 309-332, April.
  15. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
  16. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  17. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
  18. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory," Virginia Economics Online Papers 306, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  19. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
  20. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
  21. David Cooper & John Kagel, 2008. "Learning and transfer in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 415-439, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2012. "Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 921-935.
  2. Jacob Goeree & Charles Holt & Thomas Palfrey, 2005. "Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 347-367, December.
  3. Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O., 2012. "Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 208-221.
  4. Burkhard Schipper, 2011. "Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games," Working Papers, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics 115, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  5. Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "L'économétrie des données expérimentales : défis et opportunités," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, Programme National Persée, vol. 182(1), pages 7-17.
  6. Friederike Mengel & Emanuela Sciubba, 2010. "Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2010.148, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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