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Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism

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Palfrey, Thomas R.
Rosenthal, Howard
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 309-332
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:35:y:1988:i:3:p:309-332

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  2. Luigi Mittone & Francesca Bortolami, 2007. "Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison," CEEL Working Papers 0704, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juin-Kuan Chong & Colin F. Camerer & Teck H. Ho, 2005. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000537, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John Duffy & Margit Tavits, 2006. "Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model," Working Papers 273, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. McKelvey, Richard D. & Palfrey, Thomas., 1991. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Working Papers 732, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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