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Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism

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  • Palfrey, Thomas R.
  • Rosenthal, Howard
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-458X400-74/2/d14a80af3412a7163ca3687c5c1e14fe
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

    Volume (Year): 35 (1988)
    Issue (Month): 3 (April)
    Pages: 309-332

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:35:y:1988:i:3:p:309-332

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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    Cited by:
    1. Guth, W. & Nitzan, S., 1993. "Are Moral Objections to Free Riding Evolutionarity Stable?," Papers 9302, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    2. Chong, Juin-Kuan & Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H., 2006. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 340-371, May.
    3. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
    4. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Provision of public goods in a large economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 229-234, November.
    5. Rose, Steven K. & Clark, Jeremy & Poe, Gregory L. & Rondeau, Daniel & Schulze, William D., 1999. "The Private Provision of Public Goods: Tests of a Provision Point Mechanism for Funding Green Power Programs," Working Papers 127699, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    6. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
    7. Bolton, G. & Katok, E., 1995. "An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 295.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Sally, David, 2001. "On sympathy and games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-30, January.
    9. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
    10. Jens Josephson & Karl Wärneryd, 2004. "Long-run selection and the work ethic," Economics Working Papers 774, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    11. Luigi Mittone & Francesca Bortolami, 2007. "Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison," CEEL Working Papers 0704, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    12. Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "The evolution of cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma with an endogenous learning mutant," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 347-373, July.
    13. Wiser, Ryan H., 1998. "Green power marketing: increasing customer demand for renewable energy," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 107-119, June.
    14. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Private provision of discrete public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 292-299, September.
    15. R. Cookson, 2000. "Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 55-79, June.
    16. Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2000. "Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 315-337, August.
    17. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.

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