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Does Game Theory Predict Well for the Wrong Reasons: An Experimental Investigation

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Author Info
Partow, Z.
Schotter, A.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9389/RR93-46.pdf
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 93-46.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1993
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:93-46

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Keywords: game theory;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brandt, J. & Holt, C.A., 1990. "Dominance and Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 139.90, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1992. "An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1350-65, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 86-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. ABDALLA, A. & COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Forward Induction In Coordination And Battle Of The Sexes Games: Some Experimental Results," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  6. Brandts, Jordi & Holt, Charles A, 1993. "Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 279-302.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel & Wei Lo, 1999. "Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," Artefactual Field Experiments 0034, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  2. Juin-Kuan Chong & Colin F. Camerer & Teck H. Ho, 2005. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000537, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Potters, J & Winden, F. van, 1995. "Comparitive statics of a signaling game : an experimental study," Discussion Paper 126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David J. Cooper et al., 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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