Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Training Without Certification: An Experimental Study

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nadège Marchand
  • Claude Montmarquette

    ()

Abstract

Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions, excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and share a rent generated by the workers' training? What conditions will induce workers to accept the training offer, for employers to initially offer the training and to reward the trained workers in the last stage of the game? We analyse the impact of the size of the rent created by training and the existence of an information system on employer reputation rewarding trained employees. Reputation does matter to induce cooperation, but in the absence of external institutions, coordination on the optimal outcome remains difficult. Nous étudions les déterminants de la formation des travailleurs en entreprises en mobilisant l’économie expérimentale. Nous voulons répondre aux questions suivantes : Sous quelles conditions, excluant la formule d’une accréditation externe, les travailleurs et les employeurs acceptent de collaborer dans la formation des travailleurs? Sous quelles conditions une offre de formation est proposée par l’employeur, acceptée par le travailleur, et honorée par l’employeur dans la dernière phase du jeu? L’étude montre l’impact du niveau des gains générés par la formation sur la coopération entre employeurs et travailleurs. Elle montre également qu’un système d’information qui révèle aux travailleurs la réputation de l’employeur à honorer ses promesses, favorise la coopération et la formation des travailleurs. Mais, néanmoins, sans institution externe validant la formation reçue, la coopération optimale demeure difficile à réaliser.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2008s-01.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2008s-01.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-01

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: general and specific training in firms; accreditation; cooperation and reputation; experimental economics.; formation générale et spécifique en entreprises; accréditation; coopération et réputation; économie expérimentale.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," NBER Working Papers 6357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "How Effective are Electronic Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  3. David H. Autor, 2001. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1409-1448, November.
  4. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  5. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February.
  7. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 2000. "Why Do Firms Invest in General Training? 'Good' Firms and 'Bad' Firms as a Source of Monopsony Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 2536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, . "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," IEW - Working Papers 019, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  9. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1457-1468, August.
  10. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Who should invest in specific training?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 329-357, April.
  11. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 1997. "On-the-Job Training," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ojt, December.
  12. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  14. Garcia, Federico & Arkes, Jeremy & Trost, Robert, 2002. "Does employer-financed general training pay? Evidence from the US Navy," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 19-27, February.
  15. Daron Acemoglu & Joern-Steffen Pischke, 1999. "Certification of Training and Training Outcomes," Working papers 99-28, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  16. Alison L. Booth & Mark L. Bryan, 2005. "Testing Some Predictions of Human Capital Theory: New Training Evidence from Britain," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 391-394, May.
  17. Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Chris van Klaveren, 2002. "Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-090/3, Tinbergen Institute.
  18. Mark A. Loewenstein & James R. Spletzer, 1999. "General and Specific Training: Evidence and Implications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(4), pages 710-733.
  19. Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep & Oosterbeek, Hessel, 2004. "Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1399-1410, December.
  20. Brandts, Jordi & Figueras, Neus, 2003. "An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 89-115, January.
  21. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9.
  22. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July.
  23. Peraita, Carlos, 2001. "Testing the Acemoglu-Pischke model in Spain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 107-115, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.