Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
AbstractStandard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in which a firm invests the socially optimal amounts in general and specific training if the worker is sufficiently motivated by reciprocity. A reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment. We present empirical evidence that supports the proposed mechanism. Workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15% higher training rates than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2005.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 72 (2005)
Issue (Month): 285 (02)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Edwin Leuven & Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Chris van Klaveren, 2002. "Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-090/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Florian Englmaier & Stephen G. Leider, 2008.
"Contractual and Organizational Structurewith Reciprocal Agents,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2415, CESifo Group Munich.
- Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 146-83, May.
- Gerards, Ruud & de Grip, Andries & Witlox, Maaike, 2012.
""Employability-Miles" and Worker Employability Awareness,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6818, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ruud Gerards & Andries de Grip & Maaike Witlox, 2014. "'Employability-miles' and worker employability awareness," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(9), pages 952-965, March.
- Gerards Ruud & Grip Andries de & Witlox Maaike, 2012. "Employability-miles and worker employability awareness," ROA Research Memorandum 010, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
- Gerards Ruud & Grip Andries de & Witlox Maaike, 2012. "“Employability-miles” and worker employability awareness," Research Memorandum 043, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Sascha O. Becker & Dolores Messer & Stefan C. Wolter, 2011. "A Gift is not Always a Gift: Gift Exchange in a Voucher Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 3488, CESifo Group Munich.
- Nadège Marchand & Claude Montmarquette, 2008.
"Training Without Certification :An Experimental Study,"
- Nadège Marchand & Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "Training Without Certification: An Experimental Study," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-01, CIRANO.
- Nadège Marchand & Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "Training Without Certification : An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0823, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Bilanakos, Christos, 2013.
"Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 117-132.
- Christos Bilanakos, 2011. "Career Concerns and Firm – Sponsored General Training," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 07-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Florian Englmaier & Stephen G. Leider, 2012. "Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field," CESifo Working Paper Series 3707, CESifo Group Munich.
- Gerald Pruckner & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "A natural field experiment on newspaper purchasing," Natural Field Experiments 00320, The Field Experiments Website.
- Asplund, Rita, 2004. "The Provision and Effects of Company Training. A brief review of the literature," Discussion Papers 907, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Rita Asplund, 2005. "The Provision and Effects of Company Training: A Brief Review of the Literature," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 47-73.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.