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Training Without Certification : An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Nadège Marchand

    (GATE, University of Lyon, CNRS, ENS-LSH, Centre Léon Bérard, France)

  • Claude Montmarquette

    (University of Montreal and CIRANO)

Abstract

Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions, excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and share a rent generated by the workers’ training? What conditions will induce workers to accept the training offer, for employers to initially offer the training and to reward the trained workers in the last stage of the game? We analyse the impact of the size of the rent created by training and the existence of an information system on employer reputation rewarding trained employees. Reputation does matter to induce cooperation, but in the absence of external institutions, coordination on the optimal outcome remains difficult.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadège Marchand & Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "Training Without Certification : An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0823, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0823
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    general and speficic trainings in firms; accreditation; cooperation and reputation; experimental econonmics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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