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Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty

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  • Benson, Alan

Abstract

This study asks why hospitals provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty. This support is striking because nursing education is clearly general, clearly paid by the firm, and information asymmetries appear minimal. Using AHA and survey data, I find hospitals employing a greater share of their MSA's registered nurses are more likely to provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty, net of size and other institutional controls. Given the institutional context, I interpret this result as unusually specific evidence that technologically general skill training may be made de facto-specific by imperfect and costly mobility.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 149-159

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:1:p:149-159

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

Related research

Keywords: Training and education; Monopsony and labor market segmentation; Nursing Manpower and Shortages; Labor Mobility; Firm-sponsored general education;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Manning, Alan, 2011. "Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier.

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