This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms andexternal search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocationof resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changesin the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We findthat private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate tochanges in productivity. The incentive power of the wage contracts is positively related tohigh productivity, low unemployment benefits and high search frictions.
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number
dp0832.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data) J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General
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