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Worker Replacement

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Author Info
Menzio, Guido
Moen, Espen R

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Abstract

We consider a frictional labor market in which firms want to insure their senior employees against income fluctuations and, at the same time, want to recruit new employees to fill their vacant positions. Firms can commit to a wage schedule, i.e. a schedule that specifies the wage paid by the firm to its employees as function of their tenure and other observables. However, firms cannot commit to the employment relationship with any of their workers, i.e. firms can dismiss workers at will. We find that, because of the firm's limited commitment, the optimal schedule prescribes not only a rigid wage for senior employees, but also a downward rigid wage for new hires. Moreover, we find that, while the rigidity of the wage of senior workers does not affect the allocation of labor, the rigidity of the wage of new hires magnifies the response of unemployment and vacancies to negative shocks to the aggregate productivity of labor.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7075.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7075

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Related research
Keywords: Business Cycles; Competitive Search; Risk Sharing; Unemployment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John Kennan, 2006. "Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 11967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2008. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Working Papers tecipa-327, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Beaudry, Paul & DiNardo, John, 1991. "The Effect of Implicit Contracts on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 665-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Leena Rudanko, 2005. "Labor Market Dynamics under Long Term Wage Contracting," 2005 Meeting Papers 876, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Andy Snell & Jonathan Thomas, 2006. " Labor Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-Unemployment Dynamics," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0603, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Mark Gertler & Antonella Trigari, 2006. "Unemployment fluctuations with staggered Nash wage bargaining," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
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  8. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Baily, Martin Neil, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Robert E. Hall, 2005. "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 50-65, March. [Downloadable!]
  11. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Martins, Pedro S. & Snell, Andy & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2009. "Real and Nominal Wage Rigidity in a Model of Equal-Treatment Contracting," IZA Discussion Papers 4346, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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