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Labor Market Cycles, Unemployment Insurance Eligibility, and Moral Hazard

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Author Info

  • Miquel Faig

    (University of Toronto)

  • Min Zhang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 41-56

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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:10-112

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Related research

Keywords: Search; Matching; UI eligibility; Moral hazard; Unemployment; Business cycles; Labor markets;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Kurt Mitman & Stanislav Rabinovich, 2014. "Unemployment Benefit Extensions Caused Jobless Recoveries!?," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

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