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Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity

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Author Info
Moen, Espen R
Rosen, Asa

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Abstract

This paper examines competitive search equilibrium when workers' effort choice and 'type' are private information. We derive a modified Hosios Rule determining the allocation of resources, and analyze how private information influences the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in macroeconomic variables. Most importantly, private information increases the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in the general (type- and effort independent) productivity level. If the changes also affect the information structure, the responsiveness of the unemployment rate may be large, even if the changes in expected productivity are small.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5554.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5554

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Related research
Keywords: private information; search; unemployment; wage rigidity;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Strand, Jon, 1992. "Business cycles with worker moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1291-1303, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John Kennan, 2006. "Private Information, Wage Bargaining and Employment Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 11967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 1997. "Contractual Fragility, Job Destruction, and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 873-911, August.
    Other versions:
  5. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Moen, Espen R & Rosen, Asa, 2003. "Equilibrium Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 3790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2001. "Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 75-102, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Robert Shimer, 2007. "Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 13421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Krause, M.U. & Lubik, T.A., 2004. "On-the-job search and the cyclical dynamics of the labor market," Discussion Paper 92, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Espen R. Moen & Asa Rosén, 2004. "Does Poaching Distort Training?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1143-1162, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Weiss, Andrew W, 1980. "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 526-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dale Mortensen, 1984. "Job Search and Labor Market Analysis," Discussion Papers 594, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Robert E. Hall, 2005. "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 50-65, March. [Downloadable!]
  17. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M & Gomme, Paul, 1994. "Labor Turnover and the Natural Rate of Unemployment: Efficiency Wage versus Frictional Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 276-315, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-49, November.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2009. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 14915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Renato Faccini & Salvador Ortigueira, 2008. "Labor-Market Volatility in the Search-and-Matching Model: The Role of Investment-Specific Technology Shocks," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/39, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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