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Tradable Immigration Quotas

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  • Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga
  • Hillel Rapoport

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

International migration is maybe the single most e¤ective way to alleviate poverty at a global level. When a given host country allows more immigrants in, this creates costs and bene ts for that particular country as well as a positive externality for all those (individuals and governments) who care about world poverty. This implies that the existing international migration regime is inefficient as it fails to internalize such externality. In addition, host countries quite often restrict immigration due to its apparently unbearable social and political costs. However these costs are never measured and made comparable across countries. In this paper we rst discuss theoretically how tradable immigration quotas (TIQs) can reveal information on such costs and, once coupled with a matching mechanism taking into account migrants’ preferences, generate substantial welfare gains for all the parties involved. We then propose two potential applications: a market for the resettlement of international (e.g., climate change) refugees, and an extension of the US diversity lottery to a larger set of host countries and other immigration targets. Both applications are seen as possible precursors to a full implementation of a TIQs system.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2011-26.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2011-26

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Keywords: immigration; immigration policy; tradable quotas; refugees; climate change; international public goods;

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References

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Should immigration quotas be traded?
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-07-14 14:32:00
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Cited by:
  1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Mesnard, Alice, 2012. "Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Aurore Gary & Mathilde Maurel, 2013. "The effect of donors' policy coherence on growth," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00825816, HAL.
  3. Aurore Gary & Mathilde Maurel, 2013. "The effect of donors' policy coherence on growth," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13046, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  4. Biavaschi, Costanza & Elsner, Benjamin, 2013. "Let's Be Selective about Migrant Self-Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 7865, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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