Selecting Negotiation Processes with Health Care Providers
AbstractWe address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Two different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers. The second mechanism is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select a negotiated solution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 30.
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Bargaining; health care provision; Any willing provider;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Production
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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