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Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care

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Author Info
Pedro Barros ()
Xavier Martinez-Giralt ()

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Abstract

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third-party payer. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10754-005-1867-3
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 191-204
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:5:y:2005:i:2:p:191-204

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=106603

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Related research
Keywords: professional associations negotiation health care

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fingleton, John & Raith, Michael, 2001. "Open Covenants, Privately Arrived At," CEPR Discussion Papers 2709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Barros Pedro Pita & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2005. "Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 9(5), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Public versus private health care in a national health service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(6), pages 579-601. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-26.


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