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Bowley Duopoly Under Vertical Relations

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  • Tohru Wako
  • Hiroshi Ohta

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  • Tohru Wako & Hiroshi Ohta, 2015. "Bowley Duopoly Under Vertical Relations," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 778-790, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:20:y:2015:i:5:p:778-790
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
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    4. Larry S. Karp & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 1993. "A Dynamic Model of Oligopoly in the Coffee Export Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(2), pages 448-457.
    5. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1979. "Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 137-141, March.
    6. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
    7. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    8. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August.
    9. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1976. "Related Market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 267-277, June.
    10. Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring.
    11. Tohru Wako & Hiroshi Ohta, 2005. "Who Benefits From Corroding Keiretsu?," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 539-556, December.
    12. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    13. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999. "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 105-129, July.
    14. Abiru, Masahiro & Nahata, Babu & Raychaudhuri, Subhashis & Waterson, Michael, 1998. "Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 463-480, December.
    15. Spencer, Barbara J. & Brander, James A., 1992. "Pre-commitment and flexibility : Applications to oligopoly theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1601-1626, December.
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