Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care
AbstractIn several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 466.00.
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Professional Associations; Health Care; Negotiation;
Other versions of this item:
- Pedro Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2005. "Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 191-204, June.
- Pedro Pita Barros & Xavier Martinez-Giralt, 2003. "Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care," Working Papers 81, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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